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Foreclosure by Power of Sale: 
Securing a Proper Price in New Brunswick, 1983-1987
This essay follows an article published in this journal in 1983.1 At that time it 
was argued that forced sale practices in New Brunswick could not ensure 
reasonable sale prices and that creditors were thereby exposed to potential 
liability for failure to adhere to the appropriate standard of care when exercis­
ing a power of sale. Also, attention focused on the statutory right of a 
foreclosing creditor to buy in at its own sale and the extent to which the exer­
cise of that right could lead to an abuse of a remedial process. Since then there 
have been both trial and appellate decisions which warrant further analysis 
and, in certain instances, critical comment. A critical analysis is necessary 
given the development of a rule of law permitting the creditor to purchase at its 
own auction for a nominal amount and to sue the debtor for virtually the full 
amount of the indebtedness, without obligation on the creditor to reconvey the 
lands taken as security. How the law endorses such a consequence will be ex­
plained and it will be argued that the prevailing law cannot be justified.
Law review articles may seek to effect changes in the law or to point out 
the inadequacies of judicial analyses. Both goals underlay the writer’s earlier 
piece. It must be said, however, that neither the issues raised nor the 
arguments advanced in the earlier article have been fully addressed by the 
courts. Accordingly, it is appropriate at the outset to provide the reader with a 
summary of the earlier analysis together with an examination of the subse­
quent relevant decisions of the New Brunswick courts. In addition to pursuing 
the aforementioned objectives, this essay also seeks to emphasize the degree to 
which foreclosure practices in New Brunswick constitute an abuse of a 
remedial option. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the in­
effective foreclosure practices followed in this province could result in 
substantial liability claims against solicitors acting on behalf of foreclosing 
creditors. This last assertion should in itself stimulate a renewed interest in 
mortgage law among members of the profession.
Summary
The analysis offered in 1983 demonstrated that adherence solely to the terms 
of the mortgage contract and the relevant provisions of the Property Act as a 
means of attracting potential purchasers has nearly always been a futile exer­
cise.2 The insertion of legal notices of sale in local newspapers, the posting of 
notices at locations of purely historical significance and publication in the 
Royal Gazette can best be described as devices favouring the foreclosing 
creditor as successful purchaser. With respect to the last requirement, the 
legislature did intervene in 1986 by amending the Sale o f  Lands Publication
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Act and the Property Act so as to dispense with publication in the Gazette.3 In 
any event, it is unlikely that publication in this medium ever achieved its alleg­
ed purpose. Thus it is patent that foreclosure practices afford little protection 
to those who remain liable on the mortgage covenant and particularly those 
who are subject to a deficiency judgment determined by an arbitrary bid of the 
foreclosing creditor. Since creditors have an entrenched right to purchase at 
their own auction, the primary legal issue concerns the standard of care to be 
required of the foreclosing creditor when exercising the power of sale. In other 
words, what obligations are to be imposed on the creditor when marketing and 
selling to ensure that the sale price is reasonable? No one can deny the ex­
istence of a “ duty of care” . Traditionally the legal debate has centered on 
whether the standard of care is circumscribed by mere good faith considera­
tions or is augmented by the obligation to adopt reasonable precautions in ac­
cordance with the usual notions of delictual responsibility.
Despite various judicial formulations of the appropriate standard, the 
issue can be reduced to a simple question: will the creditor be held accountable 
for negligent acts even though he may be said to have acted in good faith? Ac­
cording to 19th-century law a creditor who acted in good faith would not be 
held responsible for negligent conduct. Of course there remained the difficulty 
of determining the point when negligent behaviour constituted acting in bad 
faith. Nonetheless, developments in English law in the 20th-century have 
resulted in the adoption of a more stringent standard: that of good faith and 
accountability for negligent acts. In Cuckmere Brick Co. v. Mutual Finance 
Ltd. the English Court of Appeal noted that the foreclosing creditor had failed 
to disclose to potential purchasers an alternative and more valuable use for the 
undeveloped lands that were being auctioned.4 Notwithstanding a comprehen­
sive effort to bring the property to the attention of the market place, that omis­
sion resulted in the creditor being held accountable for what might have been 
offered had the creditor met the required standard of care.
In Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce v. Haley the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal applied the Cuckmere standard to render a creditor with 
security under section 88 of the Bank Act [now s. 179] accountable for selling 
inventory hastily without any effort to attempt a sale to other comparable 
companies in the vicinity.3 A year later that same standard was applied by Mr. 
Justice Angers in Nova Scotia Savings & Loan v. MacKenzie.6 The foreclosing 
creditor sought a deficiency judgment after buying in at its own sale for 
$10,000 and effecting a subsequent sale for $19,000. The deficiency judgment 
sought was based on the first sale price. In what must be regarded as an impor­
tant, albeit brief, judgement, his Lordship held that a marketing scheme based 
solely on the provisions of the Property Act could not be considered 
reasonable. Since the only evidence as to the market value of the property was 
that of the second sale effected through the efforts of a real estate agency, the
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debtor was deemed to have suffered a loss equivalent to the difference between 
the two sale prices. Therefore, the deficiency judgment was based on the 
higher sale price. The decision in MacKenzie demonstrated clearly the need to 
evaluate and alter foreclosure sale practice and yet the practices of the past 
continue.
One of the purposes of my earlier article was to examine the weaknesses 
of the MacKenzie decision which might enable the creditor to continue to 
claim immunity for conduct amounting to negligence. At that time three possi­
ble defences were raised. Two were noticed by Mr. Justice Angers in MacKen­
zie.1 However, the court declined to interpret the two provisions of the Proper­
ty Act which could be invoked to exonerate the foreclosing creditor of 
liability.8 The third possible challenge stemmed from the misconceived notion 
that strict compliance with the mortgage document and Property Act con­
stituted a complete defence to apparently tortious conduct.
Turning first to the provisions of the Property Act, subsection 47(6) states 
that the foreclosing creditor is not responsible for any involuntary loss arising 
from the exercise of the power of sale. By implication the creditor is responsi­
ble for voluntary loss. This provision neither supports nor undermines the 
creditor’s position. Until a meaning is ascribed to the phrase “ involuntary 
loss” , the relevance of the subsection remains undetermined. If, however, the 
Cuckmere standard is applied (which this writer advocates), a court could 
define voluntary loss as any loss resulting from the failure to adhere to that 
standard; that is, those accruing from a failure to act in good faith or failure to 
adopt reasonable precautions. Involuntary losses would be restricted to those 
beyond the control of the creditor as, for example, those attributable to 
depressed market conditions at the time the power is to be exercised. Of 
course, it is clear at law that the creditor is under no obligation to postpone a 
sale until market conditions have improved.
Paragraph 44(l)(a) of the Property Act is also relevant; read literally it 
suggests that the creditor has the power to sell and may buy in without being 
answerable for any loss occasioned thereby. However, if as a matter of policy 
a court believes that the Cuckmere standard should prevail, this end could be 
achieved easily by holding that the word “ loss” means involuntary losses. 
Such a reading would be consistent with the interpretation given to subsection 
47(6) of the Act. Ultimately the issue is whether the arguments which can be 
advanced in favour of the more stringent standard outweigh those supporting 
the good faith standard. The decision in Haley elicits a positive response.9
The final argument is not an acceptable justification for confining the 
creditor’s obligations to one of good faith. That is, to argue that strict com­
pliance with the requirements of the mortgage document and the Property Act 
precludes any claim based on negligence (the action is properly one of “ ac­
counting” ) is simply to apply mechanically a legal device limiting the creditor’s
7See “ Foreclosure by Power of Sale” , supra, note 1 at 114.
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obligations without offering adequate policy reasons. Proponents of the more 
rigorous standard would hold that “ strict compliance” should only be regard­
ed as a minimum standard. Yet an argument dealing strictly with the statute 
avoids the central policy issue and merely reinforces preconceived notions of 
what the law is or should be. Nevertheless, the strict compliance test can be 
challenged since it derives from an unsupportable premise, namely that the 
notice provisions prescribed by the Act and transcribed in the mortgage con­
tract are intended to attract purchasers to a pending auction. The original pur­
pose of the notice provisions of the Act was to provide the foreclosing creditor 
with alternative methods of informing the mortgagor of the proposed exercise 
of the power.10 Admittedly that purpose was obscured as a result of an amend­
ment to the Act in 1979 requiring compliance with each of the notice provi­
sions. However, the fact that all of the legal notices of sale are directed solely 
at the mortgagor and toward those with an interest in the equity of redemption 
cannot be ignored. One rarely, if ever, sees an advertisement directed at the 
market place or one which emphasizes the marketable features of the property. 
Consequently the possibility of effecting a genuine sale at a reasonable price is 
remote. In such circumstances, it is unreasonable to maintain that strict com­
pliance with the notice requirements is equivalent to acting in good faith.
The Intervening Years (1983-1987)
In forced sales of property other than realty, the New Brunswick Court of Ap­
peal continues to apply the Cuckmere standard adopted originally in the Haley 
case. In Bank o f Nova Scotia v. Beck, the court dismissed a deficiency action 
against a chattel mortgagor where the bank had sold security for $20,000 
which the mortagor had purchased two years earlier for $50,000.11 However, 
unlike sales of realty, the marketing techniques adopted prior to the auction — 
at which other equipment was offered — successfully attracted over 800 bid­
ders. Nonetheless the deficiency judgement was denied. The mortgagee failed 
to obtain an appraisal of the security, to set a reserve bid and to attempt first a 
sale in the local retail market. The auction in this case was directed at 
wholesalers. It must be asked whether a valid distinction can be drawn between 
the standard of care required of a chattel mortgagee and that demanded of a 
creditor whose security is real property. Absent contractual or statutory con­
siderations the answer to this question is obvious. Rules of law which result in 
differing degrees of protection for debtors on the basis of the type of property 
secured should be rejected on principle. Indeed, the provisions of our Property 
Act apply equally to mortgages of both chattels and realty.12
Before turning to the New Brunswick decisions at first instance, there re­
mains one appellate decision which, by oversight, was omitted from discussion 
in the earlier essay. In Central Trust v. Rosebowl Holdings Ltd. the late Mr. 
Justice H. Ryan dealt with the problem of price adequacy in the context of a
l0See “ Foreclosure by Power of Sale” , supra, note 1 at 108-10.
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foreclosing creditor of realty.13 While this judgement may appear to challenge 
the proposition advocated, it does not preclude the adoption of the more 
rigorous standard of care. The material facts are straightforward. In 1972 the 
defendant Rosebowl purchased a property for $101,000 of which $75,000 was 
raised by way of mortgage to the plaintiff. The defendant Heustis guaranteed 
the mortgage loan. In 1973 Rosebowl sold the property to a third party for 
$105,000 with the purchaser assuming the plaintiff’s mortgage. In 1976 the 
purchaser defaulted on the mortgage and the plaintiff exercised its power of 
sale and bought in at the auction for $25,000. The plaintiff then offered the 
property to the defendants for $72,000 which offer was rejected. Subsequently 
the property was sold to a third party for $30,000. The plaintiff then sought a 
deficiency judgement against the defendants on the basis of the difference bet­
ween the outstanding indebtedness and the price paid at the auction sale. The 
evidence revealed that at the time of the forced sale the property was appraised 
at $60,000. Six months later an appraisal placed the fair market value of the 
property at $60,000, although realizable market value was estimated to be 
$45,000 due primarily to a change in market conditions. Counsel for the defen­
dants argued simply that the deficiency should be calculated in regard to the 
$60,000 market value. The court held that the plaintiff was not obligated to 
sell for this amount, nor prohibited against selling for a lower amount. As the 
standard of care required of a foreclosing mortgagee was not addressed by 
counsel or the court, it is extremely difficult to challenge such reasoning. At no 
time has it been suggested by the writer, or held by a court that a foreclosing 
creditor is under an obligation to sell for the alleged market value of the pro­
perty. However, a sale to the foreclosing creditor at forty per cent of the pro­
perty’s market value should not be viewed as acceptable. Ultimately the Court 
of Appeal may be called upon to reconcile its decisions in Haley and Beck with 
that in Rosebowl Holdings. The application of the Cuckmere standard would 
not seem to contradict the reasoning of the court in Rosebowl.
There is, however, a trial decision that does provide a great obstacle to the 
adoption of the Cuckmere standard, that of Mr. Justice Dickson in Bank o f  
Montreal v. Allender Investments L td.14 The foreclosing bank bought for $100 
at its own sale a property which had been appraised earlier at $46,000. In time 
the bank made application to have the court answer questions relevant to the 
obligations of a mortgagee when effecting a forced sale and in particular with 
respect to the right to claim a deficiency judgement calculated by reference to 
the $100 sale price. Ultimately the court declared that the bank was entitled to 
a judgement for the difference between the outstanding indebtedness of 
$45,000 and the $100 purchase price. As to the standard of care required of the 
bank, the court held that a creditor who adheres strictly to the terms of the 
mortgage contract and to the provisions of the Property Act cannot be held ac­
countable for negligence. In short, strict compliance represents the limits of 
the creditor’s obligations. Accordingly the Haley and Cuckmere cases were 
distinguished, as both held the creditor responsible for a sale effected at an 
undervalue because of negligence. As for the result in MacKenzie, Mr. Justice
IJ(1981), 34 N.B.R. (2d) 308 (C.A.).
i4(1983), 53 N.B.R. (2d) 143 (Q.B.).
Dickson concluded that, “ it was not founded upon a recognized principle of 
law” .15
With deference, the equitable solution adopted in the MacKenzie case 
does not stand alone in Canadian jurisprudence. In Newfoundland a deficien­
cy judgement is calculated with regard to the higher of the two sale prices and 
the same solution is mandated by the Civil Code of Quebec.16 Moreover, the 
provisions of the Conveyancing Act of Newfoundland mirror those of the Pro­
perty Act of New Brunswick.17 In Newfoundland and Quebec the problem of 
price adequacy which stems from ineffective marketing schemes has been 
recognized and an equitable solution provided. The more appropriate solu­
tion, however, would be to require an effective sale in the first instance. But 
until that solution is implemented the requirement that deficiency judgements 
be calculated with regard to the higher of the sale prices does provide debtors 
with some protection.
While a charge of unjustified enrichment would be warranted where a 
foreclosing creditor claimed the right to a deficiency judgement based on a 
$100 sale to itself and the right to retain the property, such a defence would 
have been inappropriate in Allender. The bank sought only the former and 
stood prepared to reconvey the land in question on payment of the debt. 
Nevertheless the invitation to compromise was deemed by the court “ inconse­
quential” and accordingly a potential windfall accrued to the bank. Had the 
court accepted the bank’s gratuitous offer, it would have been difficult to 
assail the result as it is one accepted and applied by courts of equity in 
analogous situations. Equating a sale to the foreclosing creditor with the gran­
ting of an equitable decree for foreclosure absolute, whereby the creditor ob­
tains title to the land, the established rule is that the creditor may seek and ex­
ecute upon a personal judgement provided that he remains in a position to 
reconvey the land.18 Of course, by rejecting the bank’s offer Mr. Justice 
Dickson enabled the creditor to be enriched contrary to fundamental equitable 
principles.
But the criticisms of Allender do not end here. Though the creditor’s 
obligations are addressed in terms of “ strict compliance” , one must presume 
that the good faith requirement remains intact. Thus, it is still open to ask 
whether or not the result is supportable in law. To the extent that a creditor’s 
obligations are confined to good faith, that standard of care is held to be 
breached if the creditor either fraudulently, wilfully or recklessly sacrifices the 
mortgagor’s interests.19 Does not a sale at a price of $100 constitute a reckless 
sacrifice of the property? But even if the creditor can be said to have acted in
15Ibid. at 156.
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good faith, the granting of the deficiency judgement in these circumstances is 
contrary to another accepted principle. In Haddington Island Quarry Co. v. 
Huson the Privy Council held that as long as the power is exercised in good 
faith the court will not interfere even though the sale was made at a disadvan­
tageous price, unless the price is so low as in itself to evidence a fraud.20 Surely 
a sale of property valued by the foreclosing creditor at $46,000 for $100 
evidences fraud or provides a valid reason for setting aside the sale. Why have 
creditors, selling under judicial supervision, failed to convince the courts that a 
deficiency judgement should be granted where the foreclosing creditor has 
purchased for 25C or $50, yet a sale for $100 under a power of sale is immune 
from challenge?21
In Allender, Mr. Justice Dickson concluded that the responsibility for en­
suring that the debt is adequately covered by the amount bid in at the auction 
falls on the mortgagor and any other person liable on the covenant:
[T]o go to limits in advertising beyond the requirement of the statutes would be tan­
tam ount, in the case o f virtually all mortages to transferring to the mortgagee itself 
the responsibility for obtaining payment and to render nugatory the effect o f any 
covenant for payment entered into by either a mortgagor or its guarantor.22
The simple response to this line of reasoning is that the creditor may sue on the 
covenant independently of the security extracted without negating the effect of 
the personal covenant. Alternatively, the creditor may elect to proceed against 
the security in which case the obligation is to adopt reasonable measures to en­
sure that the sale price is a proper one in the circumstances and not one which 
necessarily equals or exceeds the outstanding indebtedness. It is unrealistic to 
require that the debtor bid in at the auction where the exercise of the power 
stems from the inability to pay on the covenant. If, on the other hand, it is 
assumed that the debtor may bid solely for the purpose of preventing a sale at 
an undervalue, what is to happen when sale prices are distorted by intermeddl­
ing debtors whose perceptions of market value may well ensure that any auc­
tion sale is aborted? Given the present odds of seeing a proper price realized, 
the debtor would indeed be justified in augmenting the chaotic nature of an 
already anarchical process.
Without question, in many instances subsequent encumbrancers will at­
tend a sale in order to protect their interests. However, most are financiers and 
are very familiar with the deficient sale practices and thus better able to ensure 
that the foreclosing creditor’s conduct does not adversely affect them. It must 
also be admitted that certain guarantors possess both the acumen and financial 
resources to counter a defective foreclosure process. But can we assume that 
all guarantors have sufficient assets either to extinguish the entire debt or to 
purchase the property for a realistic price? One can reasonably assume that 
most creditors would not be prepared to sell to anyone but themselves for
20(1911), [1911] A.C. 722 (P.C.).
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$100.23 If the foreclosing creditor elects to realize on its security rather than 
first suing on the guarantee, then the guarantor should also be able to bid in 
for the purpose of preventing a sale at an undervalue and without incurring 
further liability if that bid is accepted.
The argument that the onus of ensuring a reasonable sale price should rest 
with all parties other than the foreclosing creditor ignores the simple fact that 
it is he who has conduct and control of the sale. Moreover, the notion that the 
debtor is responsible for ensuring the reasonableness of the sale price may be 
inappropriate in circumstances such as those presented in Allender. The deb­
tors were the original mortgagor and guarantor, the property having been sold 
subject to their mortgage to a third party who had, in turn, conveyed the equi­
ty of redemption to a fourth party who placed the mortgage in default. It 
might reasonably be presumed that notice of the exercise of the power of sale 
must be served on these individuals, but recently a New Brunswick trial court 
held that such parties are not entitled to notice even though they are liable for 
any deficiency which results.24
Despite its particular and limiting factual context, Allender has been ap­
plied by other trial courts to the extent that the auction price overrides the 
resale price when calculating the deficiency. In Nova Scotia Savings & Loan 
Company v. Doucet Mr. Justice Jones granted a deficiency judgment where 
the foreclosing creditor bought for $30,000 a property appraised at $49,000 
but which had been resold for $39,000.25 Prior to the Allender decision the 
same result was imposed by Mr. Justice Hoyt in Nova Scotia Savings & Loan 
Company v. Buraglia.26 However, in that case the difference between the two 
sale prices was a mere $875.
The Abuse of a Remedial Option
While the problem of price adequacy in New Brunswick can be attributed in 
part to inappropriate sale practices, it is exacerbated by the right of the 
foreclosing creditor to purchase its security. Indeed, the creditor has little in­
centive to get the best price and is better off selling the property to himself at 
the lowest possible price. Before Allender, the solution adopted by Mr. Justice 
Angers in MacKenzie (deficiency calculated by reference to subsequent sale) 
obviated the need to categorize the exercise of the power of sale as an abuse of 
a remedial process. Nonetheless, a sale to the foreclosing creditor for a 
nominal sum and on which a deficiency judgement is to be determined cannot 
be viewed as a proper sale under any circumstances. Regardless of the manner 
in which one wishes to characterize the obligations of a secured creditor, such 
dispositions run contrary to fundamental equitable principles entrenched in 
the law.
23No matter how reasonable the assumption, there are instances where foreclosing creditors have acted other­
wise; see text, infra, note 40.
2*Caisse Populaire de Saint Jacques Limitée v. Belanger (1986), 71 N.B.R. (2d) 382 (Q.B.); but see s.40 of the 
Property Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-19, and the editor’s note to this case reported at (1986), 41 R.P.R. 216 at 218.
25(1984), 54 N.B.R. (2d) 72 (Q.B.).
26(1983), 47 N.B.R. (2d) 64 (Q.B.). His Lordship felt it unnecessary in the circumstances to reconcile Rosebowl 
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A close analysis of New Brunswick practice underscores the English 
courts’ rejection of the notion that a creditor foreclosing by power of sale 
should be permitted to purchase lands taken as security.27 Even where 
foreclosure was by judicial sale the English creditor, though permitted to pur­
chase, was subject to certain safeguards invoked by the court of equity.28 The 
most onerous requirement was the debtor consent to the creditor’s purchase. 
Secondly, the court would set the reserve bid and finally, control of the sale 
would in all likelihood be given to another party. What safeguards should be 
accorded the debtor in New Brunswick? Would it be unreasonable to require 
foreclosing creditors to offer an amount approximating the fair market value 
of the land? The judgements in Rosebowl and Allender expressly reject such a 
requirement.29 In contrast, that very safeguard is required in Nova Scotia’s 
Rules of Court.30 If a foreclosing creditor in Nova Scotia buys in at the auction 
for an amount less than the fair market value and a deficiency judgment is 
sought, the court is empowered to calculate that amount utilizing the fair 
market value. However, the prohibition against a creditor realizing a potential 
windfall is tempered by the creditor’s right to postpone the application for a 
deficiency judgement until a sale in the open market can be effected.31 Of 
course, that option resembles the solution imposed by Mr. Justice Angers in 
MacKenzie.
The disparate protections offered debtors in these two provinces requires 
explanation. In Nova Scotia the guiding principle is that the creditor is entitled 
to no more than the amount owing, particularly where the creditor is seeking a 
deficiency judgement. The possibility of the creditor being enriched at the ex­
pense of the debtor is diminished if the sale is to an independent third party. In 
New Brunswick the issue of unjustified enrichment remains unrecognized. 
This is the result of the mistaken notion that a “ public” auction will of itself 
ensure the reasonableness of the sale price. The fact that the foreclosing 
creditor may be the sole bidder and the reasons for this are deemed irrelevant 
considerations.
For clarity, it must be said that the Allender decision does not stand alone 
as an example of the inequitable treatment of debtors. An earlier judgement of 
1970, Corporation d ’Administration et de Placement Limitée v. Castonguay, 
speaks to the injustices of $100 sales.32 Though the issues of price adequacy 
and the standard of care required of a creditor did not strictly require con­
sideration, the extent to which the exercise of the power of sale can be 
characterized as an abuse of a remedial option is underlined by this decision.32 
The debtor had given a first and second mortgage to one Simard securing
27See “ Foreclosure by Power of Sale” , supra, note 1 at 113.
J ,W.R. Fisher, Sir A. Underhill, Fisher & Lightwood’s Law o f Mortgage, 9th ed. by E.L.G. Tyler (London: But- 
terworths, 1977) at 370; R.L. Ramsbotham, ed., Coates Treatise on the Law o f Mortgages, vol. 2, 9th ed. (Lon­
don: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927) at 1074.
29See Rosebowl Holdings, supra, note 13 at 319 and Allender, supra, note 14 at 154.
30Rule 47.10 (2)(a), Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules.
3‘Rule 47.10 (2)(b) and 47.10 (3), Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules.
32(1970), 3 N.B.R. (2d) 624 (S.C.A.D.).
$12,000 and $6,000 respectively. Eventually a third mortgage with a principal 
amount of $12,000 was granted to the corporation of which Simard was presi­
dent. The second mortgage was later assigned to the plaintiff corporation. 
Default occurred on Simard’s first mortgage and the property was sold under a 
power of sale to the corporation for $100. The debtor’s financial problems did 
not end there. The unsecured creditors obtained judgement against him for 
$3,465 requiring the sale of his personal property. The successful purchaser 
was the corporation which obtained title to the chattels for $3,500. Litigation 
arose when the corporation sought to share the proceeds of that sale with the 
other unsecured creditors on the basis that under the relevant legislation it was 
a creditor of the debtor for all money secured by the second and third mort­
gages.
The Appeal Court concurred with the corporation’s arguments, allowing 
it to receive $2,900 of the $3,500 which it had paid for the chattels. As a conse­
quence, the foreclosing creditor obtained both the real and personal property 
of the debtor for $700. Also a deficiency of over $15,800 remained on the se­
cond and third mortgages in addition to the $11,900 that might have been 
sought on the first. With respect to the sale of the real property for $100 the 
Court stated:
While it would appear both unfortunate and inequitable that the debtors should lose 
their property to  the [corporation] and remain liable to repay the second and 'th ird  
mortgages they did not contest their liability in these proceedings and the only issue 
raised by the judgement creditor must be resolved in favour o f the [corporation].33
While the Court of Appeal was limited to the issue posed, the fact that the sale 
of the real property went unchallenged reveals a further dimension to the pro­
blem. How is a debtor to question the conduct of a sale when unable to honour 
monthly financial obligations?
Solicitor’s Liability
The reluctance of the judiciary and bar of New Brunswick to accept that forc­
ed sale practices constitute negligence perse  is understandable. Such an admis­
sion would open the floodgates to potentially successful challenges to past and 
present foreclosure sales. The accepted and standardized sale practices, when 
compared with the expected standard of care in the common law and also in 
other forced sale situations, would almost always render the foreclosing 
creditor liable for monies which should have been received. Depending on the 
extent to which the solicitor for the foreclosing creditor has either control of 
the sale or advises the creditor in that regard, it is only logical that the creditor 
seek indemnification or contribution from the lawyer. Solicitors denying 
liability on the basis of standard practice or custom must be aware of two 
adverse arguments. First, such a defence is only prima facie evidence that the 
defendant acted reasonably. Secondly, the custom itself must be reasonable at 
law.34 The folly of seeking refuge behind accepted practice is revealed in recent
33Ibid. at 626.
34See generally J.G. Fleming, Law o f Torts (Sydney: Law Book, 1983) at 113-14; Jones v. River East School Div. 
No. 9 (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 338 (Man. C.A.). See also Cec. MacManus Realty Ltd. v. Bray (1970), 14 D.L.R. 
(3d) 564 at 568 (N.B.S.C.A.D.), Hughes J.A.
cases holding a purchaser’s solicitor negligent for having accepted an under­
taking from the vendor’s counterpart to discharge encumbrances out of the 
sale proceeds.35
The basis of the solicitor’s liability would rest not so much on a failure to 
adhere to the proper standard of care, but rather on the failure to inform the 
foreclosing creditor of the conflicting decisions with respect to the standard of 
care to be followed. Surely the creditor should be informed of the divergent 
judicial opinions and of the right to elect and to pursue a private sale through 
the efforts of a real estate broker as is done in the case of voluntary sales. Ad­
mittedly, the issue of solicitor responsibility is one step removed from the task 
of determining whether or not the more onerous standard of care will prevail 
in New Brunswick. But even if it should not, the potential liability of solicitors 
acting for these secured creditors and in regard to other sale procedures cannot 
be ignored.
It must be admitted that as long as present sale practices remain intact and 
the foreclosing creditor is permitted to buy in at its own auction, foreclosure 
by power of sale in New Brunswick is a charade. All the formalities of an in­
dependent sale are adhered to, however the foreclosing creditor generally 
negotiates with no one but himself as to what price will be paid for the debtor’s 
property. Unfortunately, on two occasions either the foreclosing creditor or its 
solicitor failed to appreciate that sales for nominal amounts are only “ com­
mercially” acceptable if the foreclosing creditor is the successful bidder. The 
first example of the omission surfaced after the “ Riviera Motel” in Caraquet 
was sold by the foreclosing creditor, a first mortgagee, to the second mor­
tgagee for $200. This puisne creditor then sold the property a day later for 
$75,200; whereby the resale price equalled the amount due on the second mor­
tgage, plus $200. This particular forced sale attracted notoriety Canada-wide 
when the federal Auditor-General reported that the Department of Regional 
Economic Expansion had honoured loan guarantees for $315,000 following 
the $200 sale.36 A “ trial by media” ensued with allegations of negligence being 
swapped by Ottawa and the foreclosing creditor. An out of court settlement 
provided for the repayment of $186,000 by the creditor.37 Canadian taxpayers 
were required to contribute $129,000.
While one might have hoped that the sale of the Riviera Motel was an 
anomalous forced sale, devoid of rational analysis, there exists a comparable 
sale. A cedar shingle mill in Me Adam, New Brunswick, valued at 1.3 million 
dollars sold for the paltry sum of $5,000.3' The mill which had been in opera­
tion for two years prior to the time of the sale, opened with the help of a 
$450,000 provincial government loan guarantee and federal government grants 
totalling $550,000. Notwithstanding the fact that the Allender decision
35See Polischuk v. Hagarty (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 446 (Ont. C.A.), revg. 149 D.L.R. (3d) 65 (Ont. H.C.) and 
Edward fVong Finance Co. v. Johnson (1983), [1984] 2 W.L.R. 1 (P.C.).
36“ Ottawa Plans Suit Over Sale of Motel”  [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 June 1984) 9.
37“ Taxpayers Lose $129,000 in N.B. Motel Incident”  [Saint John] Telegraph-Journal (1 September 1984) 5.
3,L. Billings, “ Purchase of Mill Gives McAdam Renewed Hope” [Fredericton] Daily Gleaner (12 September
1984) 3.
legitimizes both these sales, it would be unrealistic to assume that a creditor 
relying on its solicitor would not have a sound cause of action against counsel 
for permitting such sales. It is one thing for a foreclosing creditor to purchase 
for a nominal amount, and quite another to permit the property to be sacrific­
ed to a third party at everyone’s expense.
Regardless of the rationalizations which might be offered with respect to 
the sale price in these two examples, one would normally expect the foreclosing 
creditor to bid up the sale price in order to avoid a windfall accruing to a third 
party. Obviously the creditor must predetermine the maximum amount which 
he is willing to offer. However, the determination does not necessarily require 
that the sale be publicized as subject to a reserve bid. Such a requirement is 
now imposed at law. In Bank o f Nova Scotia v. Beck, the Court of Appeal ad­
monished the creditor for failing to set a reserve bid.39 Of course, the imposi­
tion of that safeguard further weakens the authority of Allender. Moreover, 
one can reasonably presume that no creditor would set a reserve bid of $100, 
nor would a solicitor recommend that such a meagre amount be set.
The failure of the creditor’s solicitor to advise of the practical necessity of 
adopting such a precaution has required judicial resolution. In Glennie v. 
Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce a solicitor was instructed by the defen­
dant, a foreclosing creditor, to bid up to $50,000 on its behalf.40 Through in­
advertance, the solicitor failed to respond to the sole bid of $25,000 made by 
the plaintiff who was successful in obtaining a decree of specific performance. 
In the circumstances and despite the confusion which surrounded the auction 
sale, the court was not prepared to declare it a nullity. Yet the facts surroun­
ding the litigation in Glennie are not unique in Canadian mortgage law. For 
example, in the Nova Scotia case of Atlantic Trust Company v. H. & E. 
General Stores Ltd. the solicitor for the foreclosing creditor was unable to at­
tend the auction when his automobile broke down.41 Consequently, property 
worth $19,000 was purchased by the second mortgagee for $1,000. Unlike the 
result achieved in Glennie, the creditor’s application to have the sale set aside, 
was granted.
Where a reserve bid is to be set, there remains the difficulty of determin­
ing the minimum acceptable offer. Undoubtedly the creditor will not be willing 
to sacrifice his interest in the property and will be perhaps more inclined to 
look for an amount which equals the indebtedness. Should the creditor pur­
chase for this amount and should the property have an equivalent or greater 
fair market value, then the creditor is not only fully protected but is also 
enriched. If the property is worth less than the indebtedness and the amount 
owing is bid, then the creditor must be taken to have voluntarily abandoned 
the right to seek a deficiency judgement. However, the potential folly of a 
foreclosing creditor (and its solicitor) who purchases for the indebtedness and 
who approaches a foreclosure sale differently than one in the open market is
39Supra, note 11.
40(1979), 25 N.B.R. (2d) 227 (S.C.T.D.).
41(1978), 3 R.P.R. 176 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
revealed in Canada Permanent Trust Company v. Letcher.*1 The plaintiff’s 
solicitor (one of the defendants) failed to have a co-owner execute a first mort­
gage on two properties. Subsequently both co-owners gave a second and a 
third mortgage on the properties to the defendants. Default occurred on the 
plaintiff’s first mortgage and the property was sold under the power of sale to 
them for the amount of the indebtedness. After the sale the plaintiffs realized 
that they had not obtained the fee simple to the properties but rather only a 
one-half undivided interest. The other half was subject to what now became 
the first and second mortgages of the defendant mortgagees. The resulting ac­
tion proceeded on the basis that the subsequent mortgagees took subject to the 
plaintiff’s equitable right to have the other co-owner execute a first mortgage 
in its favour. That is, the subsequent mortgagees took subject to a prior 
equitable mortgage of which they had notice. With regard to this aspect of the 
case the plaintiff was unsuccessful and accordingly the solicitor was held 
responsible for the loss sustained.
But did the plaintiff in fact suffer a loss? As a mortgagee it obtained what 
was owing to it on the first mortgage, and thus suffered no loss traceable to the 
defendant solicitor. As a purchaser the plaintiff must accept responsibility for 
the amount which it bid. Surely, all purchasers should search the title to the 
property before closing the transaction. If we are to perpetuate the validity of 
incestuous auction sales, then liability for miscues should not lie necessarily on 
the defendant solicitor. That dubious honour should fall on the solicitor who 
acted for the plaintiff on the exercise of the power of sale. The omission to 
undertake a search of title prior to the auction, with the result that the plaintiff 
bid more than the fair market value, is one for which the defendant solicitor in 
this case could not have been held liable. However, the foregoing analysis is 
not to be regarded as a denial of the responsibility and liability for non­
feasance by the defendant solicitor. Rather it serves to point out that a 
foreclosure system which permits the creditor to purchase its own security is 
fundamentally flawed and leads to incongruous results when applied strictly.
As noted above it will be necessary for the solicitor of the foreclosing 
creditor to undertake a proper search of title prior to the auction in the event 
that the creditor wishes to bid. Such advice may seem misguided as the 
solicitor may have already acted on the original mortgage transaction. Accor­
dingly, all that is needed is a sub-search for the purpose of determining those 
who are to be served with notice of the pending action. This qualification 
would be appropriate provided that in the original transaction each party had 
retained their own solicitor. However, as it is customary in this province for 
the solicitor to represent both parties, particularly in the purchase and sale of 
residential housing, it is contrary to ethical standards for a solicitor to act for 
the mortgagee when foreclosing against the mortgagor.43 For those who might
42(1981), 35 N.B.R. (2d) 630 (C.A.).
43See The Canadian Bar Association, Code o f Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1975), 
at 19 and Banque Provincial v. Adjutor Levesque Roofing (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 340 at 345 (N.B.S.C.A.D.), 
Limerick J.A. “ The solicitor acting for the defendant...drew the mortgage and advised the said defendant on the 
effect thereof. Later the same solicitor acting for the mortgagee bank brought action against his former client 
based on a claim arising out of and related to that mortgage. Solicitors should not so conduct themselves even 
with the knowledge and consent of all parties” . See also Flynn Development Ltd. v. Central Trust Co. (1985), 51
O.R. (2d) 57 (H.C.).
feel that this conflict of interest rule ignores the realities of the legal market 
place, readers are reminded that lawyers should not act as “ hired guns” will­
ing to sell their services to the highest bidder.
Should a solicitor breach this fiduciary obligation relating to conflict of 
interests, the debtor-client might properly consider suit. Notwithstanding the 
fact that a foreclosing creditor might be insulated from liability as in Allender, 
the debtor may seek to establish an independent claim against the solicitor for 
breach of fiduciary duty. Liability would not stem from a failure to abide by 
prevailing standards of care but rather the failure to protect the legitimate in­
terests of the debtor as would any solicitor retained by a debtor faced with a 
foreclosure sale.
An Appropriate Solution
The need for reform in this area of the law has engaged the attention of practi­
tioners and academics. In 1981 the Rules Revision Committee considered the 
possibility of resurrecting judicial foreclosure proceedings to offset the 
“ little” protection afforded mortgagors, but concluded that any imbalance 
could best be remedied by amending the relevant provisions of the Property 
A ct.44 At about the same time the New Brunswick Branch of the Canadian Bar 
Association presented a report to the Minister of Justice on the state of mort­
gage law in this jurisdiction.43 Therein the need for reform was stressed, but to 
date the government has not responded to the recommendations of either 
group.
History reveals that other provincial legislatures have not ignored flagrant 
abuses of remedial foreclosure options. During the Depression both Saskat­
chewan and Alberta abolished actions on the covenant.46 The devaluation of 
properties or the absence of a market by which market values could be deter­
mined, coupled with the right of the foreclosing creditor to purchase its securi­
ty and pursue unrealistic deficiency judgements were deemed sufficient 
reasons to invoke this reactionary measure. More recently, the British Colum­
bia legislature reacted to chattel mortgagees who were abusing the power of 
sale. That is, on default, these creditors entered into “ sweetheart deals” in 
which they would repossess goods, sell them to an associate or affiliate for an 
unrealistically low price and then sue the debtor for the deficiency.47 The 
legitimacy of such sales was rationalized on the basis that the foreclosing 
creditor was under no obligation to act in a commercially reasonable manner. 
(Of course, the same result can be achieved in New Brunswick without creating 
the illusion of a genuine sale.) The British Columbia legislature implemented
“ Barrister’s Society of New Brunswick, Civil Procedure Rules Revision Committee Final Report May, 1981 
(Fredericton: Barrister’s Society of New Brunswick, 1981) at 39.
45J.T. Robertson, “ Report on Mortgagee’s Remedies”  (Fredericton: Canadian Bar Association, New Brunswick 
Branch, Real Property Subsection, 1980).
4#The legislation was amended in the 1960’s such that corporate mortgagors could not claim the benefit of the 
legislation; see Law o f Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-8, s.41(l) and the Limitation o f Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 
1978, c. L-16, s. 2(1).
47British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Report on Debtor Creditor Relationships, Project No. 2 (Vic­
toria: Queen’s Printer, 1975) at 142.
the recommendation of its Law Reform Commission that the creditor be 
restricted to suing either for the debt owing or to realizing on the collateral, 
but not both.48
Without doubt the need for legislative interference was justified and the 
same holds true in New Brunswick. However, the writer does not embrace the 
solutions imposed in any of the western provinces. Indeed those solutions have 
served only to generate other legal issues some of which have been resolved by 
the courts but with seeming inconsistency.49 Moreover, it is clear that the 
legislation in certain instances exceeded its proclaimed goal; debtors are being 
unjustly enriched at the expense of their creditors. It is simple enough to ad­
vocate that the immediate legislative solution for New Brunswick would in­
volve the abolition of the right of the foreclosing creditor to purchase for his 
own benefit and the imposition of a more onerous standard of care. However, 
if the government refuses to respond then the onus will fall on the Court of 
Appeal to determine the nature and scope of the creditors obligations, but only 
if and when this issue is presented for consideration. While that possibility 
may be the sole means of redressing the particular inequities described above, 
it would be preferable that mortgage laws be reevaluated generally.
To that end, legislative reform should seek to provide secured creditors 
with an efficient and effective process for liquidating debts while at the same 
time providing adequate protection to all interested parties, including the deb­
tor. Such legislation should seek to effect a process which ensures the ade­
quacy of sale prices and insulates the creditor from liability. The appropriate 
solution may well require the preservation of elements of the power of sale and 
the resurrection of certain aspects of the judicial sale, such as court confirma­
tion of sale proceedings and price. Such a liquidation process could eliminate 
the debtors concern over the adequacy of the sale price and the creditor’s fear 
that someone will allege that the matter was not properly handled. Until the 
need for reform is recognized we are left with an over-abundance of conflic­
ting opinions and a foreclosure process which seems oppressive at the very 
least.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the lack of judicial or legislative protection afforded this 
species of debtor, it would be inappropriate to characterize the New Brunswick 
market place as a haven for unrelenting creditors preying on the misfortunes 
of the indigent. Indeed, it is likely that in cases where the pursuit of a deficien­
cy judgement is deemed practical, the creditor will delay until a resale has been 
effected on which the deficiency may be calculated. But even if the creditor is 
prepared to calculate the deficiency according to the resale price, there is still 
no assurance that it will be reasonable in the circumstances. At the same time,
4,See Chattel Mortgage Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, ss 23, 25.
49For example in British Columbia a seizure of the chattels operates to extinguish the debt and yet the creditor 
may have taken security on other assets. The effect of the legislation is to prevent the creditor from realizing on 
the latter: Continental Bank o f Canada v. Hildebrandt (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 367 (S.C.); but see Dewar v. Bank o f  
Montreal (1984), 59 B.C.L.R. 167 (C. A.) where the creditor had secured the loan by taking a chattel mortgage on 
two vehicles respectively and where the court held that the act of seizing one did not eliminate the right to seize 
the other.
foreclosure by power of sale provides a trap for unwary creditors and those 
unable to appreciate the illogical nature of the rules governing this game. 
Ultimately, it must be recognized that the potential for abuse in the exercise of 
the power of sale is omnipresent and is not merely a matter of academic 
speculation. There is no doubt that New Brunswick law is uniquely distant 
from the mainstream of Canadian jurisprudence.
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